The Muslim Brotherhood's Assault on Canada

Key points

• A Canadian variant of a transnational model. The report applies to Canada the framework of the ISGAP study on Muslim Brotherhood entryism in the United States. Networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood are read there not as isolated organizations, but as a long-term strategy of entrenchment: tamkeen.
• The Canadian blind spot. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and Austria have each conducted a state investigation. Canada has not - even though it is named as a target in “The Project” (1982) and the “Explanatory Memorandum” (1991).
• Federal and electoral entryism. A network of Muslim civil servants within the federal police (MFEN), a Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia, a “Vote Palestine” campaign (344 candidates in 2025), and the CMPAC, registered by a former secretary of state to Egyptian President Morsi.
• A protective narrative. Two twin notions - “Islamophobia” and “anti-Palestinian racism” - serve, according to the report, to reframe any criticism as discrimination.
• Charities and “asymmetric enforcement”. The revenue agency audited the MAC, ISNA Canada and Islamic Relief Canada. The findings are documented, but the consequences remain minimal - while other charities are deregistered more quickly.
• The university, a central arena. Opaque Qatari funding in dual-use research. Marked campus mobilization and antisemitism at Toronto, Waterloo and TMU. And an asymmetry: the partnership with Israel's Technion is severed, while Qatari ties continue without scrutiny.

Overview

This report was published in August 2026 by the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP, New York, approx. 194 pp., “Islamism Beyond Islamists” series). No individual author is named. The report extends to Canada the institute's landmark study on Muslim Brotherhood entryism in the United States (2025), which CERIF reviewed (reading note no. 2026/05). The thesis is the same. Networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood are not isolated organizations, nor a series of episodes. They form a transnational strategy: at once ideological, institutional, narrative and legal. The report examines Islamism as a political ideology, not Islam as a religion. It draws on primary sources, court records, state investigations and comparative cases (United States, France, United Kingdom, Austria).

The report's central thesis rests on a contrast. Canada is named as a target in the Muslim Brotherhood's founding documents. Yet it is the only one of these countries not to have conducted any public investigation. The report sees this as a “blind spot.” This blind spot is said to be produced by the very mechanisms it describes: the shield of Islamophobia, victimhood, and recourse to the law. In the absence of a Canadian investigation, the report relies on American, French, British and Austrian archives. One figure opens the report: according to a Canadian Heritage study (August 2026), 96% of the Jewish students surveyed experienced or witnessed at least one antisemitic incident in one year.

I. The strategic matrix: doctrine, documents, domains, Qatar

1. The doctrine: from Banna to al-Qaradawi

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. For them, Islam is not merely a religion: it is an “all-encompassing system” that governs law, politics and society. The report traces three successive architects. Al-Banna builds a patient, gradual mass movement. Sayyid Qutb delegitimizes all secular governance and calls for jihad (Milestones, 1964). Youssef al-Qaradawi, based in Qatar until his death in 2022, devises the strategy of entrenchment in the West.

The key concept is tamkeen. It is a program for the gradual entrenchment of influence, carried out in stages and with patience. The report speaks of a “double discourse”: a moderate face in public, a more radical project internally. Here it borrows a phrase from a 2025 report by the French Interior Ministry, Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France, available in the CERIF library.

The report stresses one point: antisemitism is not an accident, but a “structural component.” Al-Banna admired Nazi Germany. He oversaw an Arabic translation of Mein Kampf. As early as 1936, he made the Palestinian cause a religious obligation for all Muslims. Al-Qaradawi, for his part, cultivates a façade of moderation, the wasatiyyah (“middle way”). He treats democratic participation as a mere tactical tool, not a genuine commitment.

2. The strategic documents: “The Project” (1982) and the “Explanatory Memorandum” (1991)

Two internal documents serve as evidence. “The Project” was seized by Swiss police in 2001. The “Explanatory Memorandum” was seized by the FBI in 2004. Both were entered into evidence at the Holy Land Foundation trial (Dallas, 2008). These two founding Muslim Brotherhood documents explicitly name Canada as a target. They coin the term “civilizational jihad.” The “Explanatory Memorandum” was written by Mohammed Akram and ratified by the Shura Council. It describes the work as a “Civilization-Jihadist Process.” CERIF offers an infographic dedicated to each: “The Project” (1982) and Akram's Memorandum (1991).

3. The four operational domains of tamkeen

The report describes four major, complementary levers through which the movement takes root.

• Domain 1 - Controlling the narrative. This is the most important lever, according to the report. The aim is to control the way Islam, Islamism and the Palestinian cause are spoken about in public. The goal is to make criticism difficult, even suspect. The movement uses two means. The first is media-based: Al Jazeera and its relays broadcast the message. The second is political: an alliance with part of the militant left, around shared causes (anti-racism, anti-colonialism). The report calls this the “red-green alliance.” Within this alliance, it is the Islamists who lead. The word “Islamophobia” plays a central role here. It is gradually broadened until it covers any criticism of Islamism. Such criticism is then disqualified in advance. One telling sign, after October 7, 2023: almost no major North American Muslim organization condemned Hamas by name.
• Domain 2 - Embedding in institutions. Over time, the movement builds a web of mosques, schools, student associations (such as the MSA, the Muslim Students' Association), charities and professional networks. This web gives it a permanent presence and resources. In Canada, the report quantifies the public funds received by these structures: about $31M for the MAC (2018-2022), $9.2M for Islamic Relief Canada, $1.2M for ISNA Canada, $394,000 for the NCCM.
• Domain 3 - Influencing politics. Once established, these organizations seek to influence public decisions. They secure advisory positions with governments. And above all, they organize the vote: getting a community to vote “as a bloc” on a handful of issues. In the United States, this took the form of “Million Muslim Votes” campaigns. In Canada, the NCCM (National Council of Canadian Muslims) and The Canadian Muslim Vote adopt these methods.
• Domain 4 - Using the law as a weapon (“lawfare”). The movement turns to the courts not to win a case, but to “exhaust” its opponents. A proliferation of appeals, complaints and proceedings. The accusation of “Islamophobia” serves as a shield. The report cites as an example the organization CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations), which grew out of the Islamic Association for Palestine and has been designated a terrorist entity by the Emirates.

4. Qatar: ideological and financial hub, and amplifier

The report devotes an entire chapter to Qatar. It presents Qatar as the Muslim Brotherhood's main external backer. Qatar is a small, very wealthy emirate: fewer than 350,000 citizens and a sovereign wealth fund of around 526 billion dollars. For decades it has hosted the movement's leading figures and leadership - including al-Qaradawi and the political leadership of Hamas. Qatar, according to the report, plays a double game. Qatar remains a military and diplomatic ally of the West. But, at the same time, it spreads Muslim Brotherhood ideology through money and the media. The report details three levers.

• University money. Since 2001, Qatar has been the largest foreign funder of American universities: 6.25 billion dollars in total, including more than 1.1 billion in 2025 alone. The heaviest cases: Georgetown (more than 1 billion) and Northwestern (more than 700 million). Qatar also funds Canadian institutions: the College of the North Atlantic, Dalhousie's former campus now the University of Doha, the University of Calgary and SickKids Toronto. A Canada-Qatar agreement of September 2024 is worth 95 million dollars. This funding gives Qatar a hold over entire swaths of research.
• The media, with Al Jazeera. The Qatari state broadcaster acts as a global echo chamber. The United States asked it, in vain, to register as a foreign media outlet. In Canada, Al Jazeera reaches about 1.3 million people a month. The report links this climate to a surge of antisemitism in schools: at least 781 antisemitic incidents in Ontario schools since October 7, 2023, more than 40% of them involving Holocaust denial.
• Turning religion into a political cause. The report describes two complementary shifts. The “Palestinianization of Islam”: making the Palestinian cause the core of Muslim identity and a test of loyalty. The “Islamization of antisemitism”: giving hostility toward Jews a religious justification. The report quotes al-Qaradawi. On Al Jazeera, al-Qaradawi called for “killing them [the Jews] down to the last one” and portrayed the Holocaust as a “divine punishment.” The report also cites official Qatari school textbooks that reproduce antisemitic tropes.

II. The Canadian network: government, narrative, money

1. Federal entryism and institutional “capture”

The report first describes entryism at the heart of the state. At its center: the Muslim Federal Employees Network (MFEN). This network was founded in 2021 within the federal police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). It has about 70 members across several government departments. The MFEN circulated internal guides - one advising against handshakes. The MFEN challenged testimony from the Jewish organization B'nai Brith. It demanded, in vain, that Muslims be recognized as a protected group. Canada's Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia, Amira Elghawaby (2023-2026), backed these efforts. She lobbied ministers and security officials. Muslims, however, make up about 2% of the federal workforce. The Representative's office was dissolved in February 2026.

Electoral mobilization. Canada's Muslim population numbers about 1.8 million people (4.9%). It is concentrated in the Greater Toronto Area, Montreal, Ottawa and Vancouver. Two bodies organize the vote: The Canadian Muslim Vote and the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC). They target 60 to 80 ridings. The CMPAC was registered as a third party in March 2025 by Khaled al-Qazzaz. Al-Qazzaz was foreign affairs secretary to Egyptian President Morsi. In the 2025 federal election, the “Vote Palestine” campaign won the support of 344 candidates from four parties. The campaign brought together the CMPAC, CJPME (Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East) and the Palestinian Youth Movement.

2. The narrative architecture: Islamophobia and “anti-Palestinian racism”

The report describes an interlocking web of campus and civil-society organizations: the MSA, Students for Justice in Palestine, the Palestinian Youth Movement. The latter is linked to the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and to Samidoun (Samidoun was designated a terrorist entity in October 2024, then dissolved in March 2026). Two twin notions serve as a protective narrative.

• “Islamophobia”. The report sees it as a “lawfare tool” and an “anti-blasphemy law through the back door.” Antisemitic hate crimes are rising sharply, yet schools are urged to prioritize Islamophobia. The MAC has received more than $2M on this basis since 2018.
• “Anti-Palestinian racism” (APR). It was formalized in April 2022 by the Arab Canadian Lawyers Association. The report sees it as a mechanism that shields Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad from criticism. APR has been adopted by institutions such as the Toronto District School Board (~235,000 students).

3. The charity sector and “asymmetric enforcement”

The report applies the same framework to the charity sector. It builds on earlier ISGAP work, which identified six organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood: the MAC, the NCCM, Islamic Relief Canada, ISNA Canada, the Arab Medical Union and IRFAN-Canada.

• Muslim Association of Canada (MAC). The report considers it the first and most important. The MAC was founded in 1997. In 2017, it removed references to the Muslim Brotherhood from its bylaws. The revenue agency (CRA) conducted an audit. That audit found that the MAC “advances” the Brotherhood's cause, an undeclared non-charitable purpose. It also found that the MAC provided resources to IRFAN-Canada - an organization that was deregistered and then listed as a terrorist entity, and that channeled more than $14.6M to entities linked to Hamas. The CRA found, on a preliminary basis, that there were “sufficient grounds to revoke the charitable registration.” But the final decision (2023) did not revoke the MAC. It ended with a penalty of about $1.12M and a compliance agreement. The MAC had denounced “systemic Islamophobia” and run a campaign against the CRA.
• Islamic Society of North America Canada (ISNA Canada). A 2010 audit found the misuse of more than $600,000, deemed “tantamount to an embezzlement of funds.” In 2013, an affiliate was deregistered for paying more than $280,000 to an entity linked to Jamaat-e-Islami. In 2018, ISNA Canada was penalized (a $550,000 penalty). Yet ISNA Canada continued to receive public funds: more than $1.8M between 2020 and 2024.
• Islamic Relief Canada. This is the Canadian affiliate of Islamic Relief Worldwide, which faces allegations of ties to Hamas. In 2024, Islamic Relief Canada transferred $67.5M to affiliates of the network, including $16.3M to the West Bank/Gaza affiliate. Over the same period, it received more than $6.6M in public funds.

From this comes a key notion: “asymmetric enforcement”. The findings are documented, yet these organizations keep operating, keep receiving public funds and keep their status. Conversely, other religious charities are penalized more quickly. The report cites eight Jewish charities deregistered over two years, and eight Christian charities among 29 deregistrations in 2025 - for failings unrelated to terrorism. The report concludes that the enforcement threshold is “increasingly opaque.”

III. Universities, a central operational domain

1. The framework: foreign interference and the Qatar National Research Fund

The report recalls the warnings from Canada's security services - CSIS (the Canadian Security Intelligence Service) and NSICOP (the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians) - about foreign interference on open campuses. A federal measure from January 2024 restricts access to grants in sensitive fields. It targets China, Russia, Iran and North Korea - but not Qatar. Yet the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) is, under Qatari law, the state's funding arm. It finances dual-use projects: network security, cryptography, solar cells, artificial intelligence. One project tied to TMU even involves Barzan Holdings, the acquisition arm of Qatar's Ministry of Defense. Canada has no disclosure regime equivalent to the American Section 117. The report recalls the precedent of Texas A&M: there Qatar held contractual ownership of more than 500 projects, some sixty of them dual-use. The Doha campus will close in 2028.

2. University of Toronto

The University of Toronto is the birthplace of Israeli Apartheid Week (launched in 2004). The report treats it as a “node” of the narrative infrastructure for twenty years. In May 2024, an encampment set up there for 63 days and occupied the president's office. According to a professor quoted, a “strict majority” of participants were neither students nor affiliates. Guards in keffiyehs screened the entrance. The report sees this as an illustration of the red-green alliance: an official of a large Ontario public-service union (OPSEU) pledged to act as a “human shield.” The militant ecosystem is interlocking. It brings together Hearing Palestine (housed within the Institute of Islamic Studies) and the MSA (founded in 1965, more than 1,500 members). The MSA's parent body is named in the “Explanatory Memorandum.” The report then notes a divestment vote by the faculty association (UTFA, May 2025). It also notes the withdrawal, under pressure, of a draft guide on antisemitism. Finally, it describes foreign interference via the “Singham network.” On this campus, the group Samidoun Toronto was designated a terrorist entity in Canada on October 15, 2024. QNRF funding tied to Toronto professors is estimated at between $2.7M and $4.2M, undisclosed.

3. University of Waterloo

At Waterloo, the Qatari footprint is strong. The report documents more than $3.8M in funding from Qatari state entities (QNRF, Qatar University), through at least five projects. Waterloo ranks 9^th on a priority list of QatarEnergy, the state-owned company. With about 35 Qatari students, total Qatari investment is estimated at more than $10.7M. On the activist front, the Occupy UW encampment (“Gaza House”) lasted from May to June 2024. The university first claimed $1.5M in damages, before dropping its lawsuit. Above all, the report points to a militant faculty. Sofyan Taya, a visiting professor killed by an Israeli strike, was honored with a memorial fund by the university. Yet Taya headed the Islamic University of Gaza, described as “the main stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood” (alumni: Haniyeh, Sinwar, Deif). Another case: Mohamed Elmasry, professor emeritus and founder of the Canadian Islamic Congress, had in 2004 described all Israelis over the age of 18 as “legitimate targets.” The sharpest point comes in September 2025. The university ends its partnership with Israel's Technion, under pressure from activists. At the same time, Qatari ties continue without comparable scrutiny. It is this asymmetry that the report casts as the model's signature.

4. Toronto Metropolitan University (TMU)

At TMU, a March 2025 press investigation is telling: “You Can't Be Openly Jewish at TMU.” It reports assaults and denialist remarks. The report then analyzes the “TMU Law Letter.” This is an open letter from law students, published two weeks after October 7. It calls Israel an “apartheid state… a product of settler colonialism.” An external review deemed it a “valid exercise of student expression,” with no sanction. The faculty sometimes follows the same line: an interim associate dean called Israel a “baby-killing state.” The institution's response is marked by delay and evasion. One student claim seeks $1.3M; TMU is named in a $15M class action. The Qatari footprint runs through a memorandum of understanding signed in February 2023 with the University of Doha for Science and Technology, owned by the Qatari state. TMU depends heavily on international tuition fees: about $122M, or 28% of fees collected.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

The report concludes that these facts are not isolated incidents. They are the pieces of a single system. The narrative, institutional anchoring, networks of organizations, foreign funding and legal recourse reinforce one another. The university is its most active arena. One asymmetry keeps recurring there: Israeli partnerships are severed under activist pressure, while Qatari ties continue without equivalent scrutiny.

Canada, according to the report, constitutes a “permissive environment”. It is a country where this strategy can advance with little oversight. There are three reasons for this. Canada does not require universities to disclose their foreign funding. Its foreign-influence law (Bill C-70, passed in 2024) does not cover this university funding. And any scrutiny exposes those who undertake it to prohibitive political and legal costs.

The report makes eleven recommendations. The main ones:

• Investigate the Muslim Brotherhood networks. Align Canada with the United States. Task the security services (Public Safety Canada, CSIS) with opening an investigation, starting with the branches already designated in the United States (Executive Order 14362).
• Make foreign funding transparent. Require universities to publicly disclose funds and contracts from abroad above a certain threshold.
• Extend this transparency to charities and civil-society organizations.
• Secure sensitive research. Require a national-security review of “dual-use” (civilian and military) research collaborations.
• Strengthen oversight of charities. Give the revenue agency the means to examine networks, ideological alignment and foreign ties - and not just the accounts.
• Address a specific case. Subject the Canadian Islamic College, linked to the MAC, to regulatory review.

Work reviewed

Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), Assault on Democratic Values and Principles: How Islamist Entryism Weakens Civil Society and Higher Education in Canada, New York, ISGAP, August 2026, approx. 194 pp. (“Islamism Beyond Islamists” series), ISBN 978-1-940186-40-5 (pdf). No individual author is named. The report is published under the sole institutional responsibility of ISGAP.

Dr. Florence Bergeaud-Blackler
Anthropologist, Research Fellow at the CNRS (HDR)
Founding President of CERIF - European Center for Research and Information on the Muslim Brotherhood
cerif.eu