Qualifying without acting: the powerlessness of the Belgian secret services in the face of the Muslim Brotherhood threat

Key points

Purpose of the document. This document is a critical analysis, produced by CERIF, of report 2025.319 of the Standing Committee for the Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Services (Comité R/I), entitled “Frères musulmans - Actualisation de l'enquête de contrôle 2021.287”. This report was commissioned by the parliamentary monitoring committee on July 10, 2025, in the wake of the publication of the French report “Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France” (May 21, 2025), which designated Belgium as the “European crossroads” of the Muslim Brotherhood.

• A report that qualifies the threat with one hand and erases it with the other. The Belgian intelligence services (PFCECT) explicitly describe the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood as “extremist” and the threat as “high and a priority.” They identify four non-violent threat vectors: ideological dissemination, damage to social cohesion, subversion of the democratic process, and the capture of public funding. Yet the analytical part of the report systematically relativizes this characterization by relying on the absence of a violent threat - a criterion that the services' own definition does not treat as decisive.
• A systematic bias in the choice of sources. The Comité R/I cites four commentators on the French report - Olivier Roy, Franck Frégosi, Michaël Privot and Corinne Torrekens - all critical of that report. No researcher who has endorsed all or part of its findings is mentioned. The Committee thereby gives the false impression of an academic consensus against the French report.
• An undisclosed conflict of interest. Michaël Privot, presented as a neutral “Islamologist,” was secretary general of FEMYSO (an organization identified in the French report as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) and executive director of the European Network Against Racism (ENAR). Failing to disclose this conflict of interest in a report by a parliamentary oversight body is a methodological failing.
• The factual allegations of the French report left unassessed. The French report makes precise allegations about Belgium: funding of the LMB by Qatar and Kuwait (€1.2M), the reconstitution of the CCIF as the CCIE via Brussels, control of schools, the exploitation of the MAGIC project. None of these allegations is assessed individually. The Comité R/I settles for an overall PFCECT position that “the threat assessment diverges,” without specifying on which points.
• Six years of warnings, zero consequence. Since 2020, the same figure of “around a hundred individuals” active has been carried over without reassessment, despite the creation of the PFCECT, the relocation of French actors to Belgium and the development of Muslim Brotherhood online teaching. The most structuring recommendation - integrity vetting for sensitive public offices, arising from the Haouach affair (2021) - has produced no legislation in five years.
• Significant blind spots. Hamas in Belgium is dealt with in a footnote in a 29-page report. Muslim Brotherhood online teaching, identified as a new vector, is the subject of no recommendation. The rejection of the French claim about five “controlled” Brussels municipalities rests on press commentary, not on verification by the services.

Conclusion. Report 2025.319 is a useful institutional document for its factual elements (common definition, CIIB warning, confirmation of the displacement of actors), but deeply problematic in its analytical part. It reveals a Belgian institutional unease: the services characterize the threat, OCAM ignores it, and the Comité R/I, rather than deciding, drowns this symptomatic divergence in a profusion of media reactions that stand in for analysis. Recommendations are made by CERIF.

1. About report 2025.319 of the Standing Committee for the Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Services (Comité R/I)

This report, entitled “Frères musulmans - Actualisation de l'enquête de contrôle 2021.287”, dated March 17, 2026, was commissioned by the P&R parliamentary monitoring committee on July 10, 2025, in the wake of the publication, on May 20, 2025, of the French report “Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France,” according to which Belgium is said to be the European hub of the Muslim Brotherhood, with a dense network of associations and organizations on its territory.

The Comité R/I asked the intelligence services, as early as May 28, 2025, as well as OCAM, on June 3, 2025, for a detailed assessment of how they monitor the Muslim Brotherhood phenomenon and of the follow-up given to the recommendations made in investigation report 2021.287.

Its threefold mandate was:

• update the picture of the MB threat in Belgium;
• assess the follow-up to the 2021 recommendations;
• take a position on the French report's allegations concerning Belgium.

2. Why this report, and how the various secret services work

The institutional actors of the Belgian apparatus for monitoring the Muslim Brotherhood phenomenon:

• Comité R/I: Standing Committee for the Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Services.
• VSSE: State Security Service.
• SGRS: General Intelligence and Security Service.
• PFCECT: Platform Counter Extremism & Counter Terrorism.
• OCAM: Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis.

2.1. The Comité R/I: Standing Committee for the Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Services

Report 2025.319 is part of a sequence of work carried out by the Comité R/I since 2020. The Committee identifies gaps, makes recommendations, finds that they go unheeded, and the cycle starts again.

2020 The VSSE's annual report describes the MB as a “high and priority threat,” estimates the number of active individuals at around a hundred, and identifies 39 associations and two umbrella structures (League of Muslims of Belgium, Council of European Muslims). It is worth noting that these figures will be carried over identically for five years, without methodological reassessment.

Two investigations then open simultaneously.

=>Investigation 2021.287, the first systematic investigation into the MB, finds that the VSSE and SGRS characterize the movement as dangerous but notes a “lack of coordination between the services.” The Committee makes five recommendations.

=>Investigation 2021.285, known as the “Haouach affair” after the publication on social media by the Observatoire des Fondamentalismes in Brussels of a possible collusion between Ihsane Haouach, appointed government commissioner, and the Muslim Brotherhood. It brings to light the total absence of any prior-vetting mechanism. The committee's investigation reveals that the VSSE had finalized a warning note as early as June 3, 2021, but withheld it for more than a month, deeming the document politically sensitive and not wishing to “be instrumentalized.” This affair demonstrates concretely what the reports describe abstractly: a threat of entryism acknowledged by the services but which political considerations do not allow to be made known and dealt with.

2022 - An organizational response is given. The PFCECT is created, pooling VSSE-SGRS capacities. But while the structural advance is real, no investment is made: the SGRS sees it rather as an opportunity to “reduce the need to recruit additional staff”!.

2023-2024 - The Committee chair's finding of powerlessness. Serge Lipszyc publicly notes that “the risks do not always seem to be taken at their true measure” and denounces entryism. He again proposes the screening of civil servants, still not implemented. The Comité R/I reiterates its recommendations that have gone unheeded.

2025 - The French report: a shock from outside. The publication of the French report on the Muslim Brotherhood in May 2025 triggers, in haste, a first real analytical advance: the CIIB warning, note of June 24.

Report 2025.319 examined here is then produced. It confines itself to downplaying the threat and maximizing the few measures taken.

Six years after the first warnings, the report carries over the same estimates, the same divergences between services, and finds that the post-Haouach-affair recommendation has remained a dead letter. Knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood phenomenon in Belgium has not substantially progressed and remains well below expectations. It is this finding of inertia that justifies the present analysis and the recommendations that conclude it.

2.2. The State Security Service (VSSE): the reference service on the Muslim Brotherhood

The VSSE is the Belgian civilian intelligence service. In the institutional landscape described by the report, it occupies a central position in monitoring the Muslim Brotherhood movement: it is the one that has been designated, de facto, as the reference service on the Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2024, all documents published about the MB by the VSSE represent “systematically the single, shared viewpoint of the two intelligence services expressed through the PFCECT.”

The VSSE was the first to produce a public assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood threat. In its 2020 annual report (p. 13, cited at §23), it estimated at “around a hundred individuals” the number of people actively participating in the dissemination of MB ideology in Belgium, and at a few dozen the number of Muslim Brotherhood-leaning organizations. This figure is repeated unchanged in the 2024 (§28) and 2025 (§29) reports.

As regards the characterization of the threat, the VSSE's position is unambiguous: it considers the Muslim Brotherhood movement to be an “extremist movement representing a high and priority threat” (§26). This characterization nevertheless coexists with a recurring assertion in the annual reports: “The Muslim Brotherhood does not directly pose a threat in terms of violent actions in Belgium or against Belgian interests” (§28, 2024 annual report).

This juxtaposition reveals the fundamental tension of the Belgian apparatus: the VSSE characterizes the threat as extremist and a priority, but assesses it primarily by the yardstick of physical violence - even though the definition it has itself adopted identifies four non-violent threat vectors (ideological dissemination, damage to social cohesion, democratic subversion, capture of public funds).

In line with the 2021 recommendations, the VSSE claims to have developed, in coordination with Belgian intelligence and security partners, “a common vision and strategy around the Muslim Brotherhood phenomenon and a shared definition.” It uses its annual reports (rather vague, it must be said) to inform and raise public awareness.

2.3. The SGRS: monitoring centered on Defense

The SGRS (General Intelligence and Security Service) is the Belgian military intelligence service. Unlike the VSSE, whose mandate covers the entire spectrum of domestic threats, the SGRS concentrates its action on the MB threat specifically against Defense, in accordance with its legal missions.

In 2021, the Comité R/I had recommended that the SGRS carry out an analysis to determine whether the resources it was deploying for monitoring the Muslim Brotherhood were sufficient in view of the risk of an attempt at influence against Defense. The Committee also invited it to organize internal briefings for the designated security officers.

The SGRS's response is revealing of its stance. It reported to the Comité R/I that “since 2024, all documents about the MB published by the VSSE as the reference service systematically represent the single, shared viewpoint of the two intelligence services expressed through the PFCECT.” The SGRS considers that the establishment of the PFCECT had the benefit of “pooling human capacities in the fight against terrorism and extremism, including the MB, thereby reducing the need to recruit additional staff.”

In essence, the SGRS has offloaded the bulk of MB monitoring onto the PFCECT and the VSSE, while maintaining that it provided general training on terrorism and extremism. This stance raises questions: Muslim Brotherhood influence in military circles or within defense structures does not fall under the classic terrorist threat, but can take the form of institutional entryism that generalist modules do not specifically cover.

2.4. OCAM: a counter-terrorism service that does not work on the MB

The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) works in close collaboration with its partner services within the T.E.R. Strategy (Terrorism, Extremism, Radicalization). It is in principle responsible for monitoring non-violent but potentially destabilizing ideological movements. Yet as early as 2021, when questioned by the Comité R/I, OCAM had replied that it had never written a note or study on the Muslim Brotherhood.

It did not identify a direct threat from this movement to Belgium, mentioned neither a short- nor medium-term threat, nor confirmed the high level of the threat - contrary to the analysis of the two intelligence services. OCAM reiterated this position on June 3, 2025.

This divergence is largely explained by a question of institutional remit. OCAM is structurally designed to assess the terrorist threat - that is, the risk of moving to violent action. It is not equipped to measure a threat of the entryism, institutional subversion or systemic influence type, which are precisely the modes of operation of the Muslim Brotherhood (as defined by the PFCECT itself).

2.5. The PFCECT: origin, necessity and content of the platform

Origin and necessity

Before 2022, the monitoring of extremism and terrorism in Belgium was divided between two intelligence services operating according to distinct logics: the VSSE on the civilian and domestic side, the SGRS on the military and Defense side. This duality created risks of redundancy, gaps in information-sharing and divergences in the assessment of the threat. The creation in 2022 of the Platform Counter Extremism & Counter Terrorism (PFCECT) responds to the need for integrated cooperation. The two intelligence services pooled their capacities in the fight against extremism and terrorism there. As the SGRS itself pointed out, the platform made it possible “to pool human capacities,” reducing the need for additional recruitment and creating a single, shared viewpoint for the two services.

Content and outputs

The PFCECT has produced several outputs on the Muslim Brotherhood file:

• A common definition of the phenomenon: the MB movement is defined as “an Islamic socio-political movement, hierarchical, pyramidal and decentralized” whose ultimate aim is “to establish a regime in which religion determines every aspect of the life of individuals, of society and of the State” (page 3).
• An explicit characterization as extremism: in its note to the authorities of June 24, 2025 (§21), the PFCECT states that “the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is extremist” and that it “endangers the achievements of the rule of law.”
• The identification of four operational objectives (§21): ideological dissemination; damage to social cohesion; subversion of the democratic process; capture of public funding.
• A quantitative estimate: around a hundred active individuals and a few dozen Muslim Brotherhood-leaning organizations in Belgium.
• Targeted warnings to the authorities: notably the unclassified note of April 29, 2025 (NA/2025/679), addressed to the Walloon Government and the federal Minister of Justice, warning that “the lobbying and networking activities of the Muslim Brotherhood represent a risk to political institutions,” on the occasion of the CIIB's appointment to the Walloon Council for combating racism.

Its conclusions are: no threats because no money

• Absence of MB “major projects” for lack of sufficient funding; development of new online teaching offerings (?).
• the PFCECT expects that “the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood will remain stable over the next five years,” with limited ideological dissemination owing to the decline in their financial revenues.

The paradox of the PFCECT's position

The PFCECT produces substantial work of definition, characterization and warning. It explicitly acknowledges the extremist character of MB ideology, identifies non-violent but destabilizing modes of operation, and issues specific warnings about cases of institutional entryism (the CIIB case, see below).

Yet, faced with the French report, it adopts a minimalist stance: it “sees no indication suggesting that there is any control by the Islamists in Belgium” and judges MB influence to be “more limited than the French report suggests.”

This paradox raises a question: either the threat is extremist, high and a priority - in which case the downplaying in the face of the French report is inconsistent - or it is indeed limited - in which case the characterization of a “high and priority threat” is overdetermined. The Comité R/I does not resolve this tension; it presents it as a divergence between services, without drawing any conclusions from it.

2.6. Definition of “Muslim Brother” in the report

The report presents the definition of the Muslim Brotherhood adopted by both the VSSE and the SGRS (the PFCECT):

The PFCECT estimates at around a hundred the number of individuals located in Belgium actively participating in the dissemination of Muslim Brotherhood ideology. The PFCECT assesses that there are a few dozen Muslim Brotherhood-leaning organizations in Belgium.

This definition (p. 20) explicitly characterizes MB ideology as extremist, acknowledges the double discourse and identifies four distinct threat vectors:

The report identifies four operational objectives of the MB (§21):

• ideological dissemination;
• damage to social cohesion;
• subversion of the democratic process;
• capture of public funding to achieve this.

2.7. The CIIB case

The report recalls that the PFCECT very explicitly warned the Walloon Government and the federal Minister of Justice, on April 29, 2025, of the risks associated with a Muslim Brotherhood structure such as the Collective for Inclusion and against Islamophobia in Belgium (CIIB), prior to the appointment of this organization to the Walloon Council for combating racism.

The services point to the threat of interference by members of the Muslim Brotherhood who present themselves as “neutral,” “experts” and the “only legitimate and credible representatives of Muslim populations in Europe.” In particular, they underline the risks of influence over democratic decision-making, of diversion of public subsidies, and the reputational risk for institutions associating with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The report confirms the displacement of MB actors from France to Belgium (notably the CCIF, which became the CCIE in Brussels, a direct consequence of French security pressure: “French authorities' security pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood led to a relocation of certain actors to Belgium.” (Report 2025.319, §30).

The report confines itself to this single example. Has it really worked on the subject?

3. Intelligence services that acknowledge the threat in theory while denying the importance it has in the French report

3.1. The Belgian services' criticism of the French report

The Belgian intelligence services, which show themselves attentive to the threat, say they have serious reservations about the conclusions drawn in the French report.

The PFCECT sees no indication suggesting that there is any control by the Islamists in Belgium. The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Belgium is assessed by the PFCECT as being more limited than the French report suggests.

3.2. OCAM's position

OCAM makes recommendations on how to handle the threat (prevention, coexistence, etc.) except that it does not study it. Recall that, as early as 2021, when questioned by the Comité R/I, OCAM had replied that it had never written a note or study on the Muslim Brotherhood.

OCAM therefore did not identify a direct threat from this movement to Belgium. It mentioned neither a short- nor medium-term threat, nor confirmed the high level of the threat, contrary to the analysis of the two intelligence services.

OCAM reiterated this position on June 3, 2025 to the Comité R/I.

3.3. Developments observed by the PFCECT

On June 24, 2025, the intelligence services (PFCECT) described to the authorities the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Belgium.

But among the observed developments, the services point to “the absence of 'major projects'” for lack of sufficient funding; the “development of new online teaching offerings” conveying Muslim Brotherhood ideology and polarizing discourse; and a relocation of certain actors present in France to Belgium.

The services specify that they expect “the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood to remain stable over the next five years,” and that initiatives to disseminate the ideology and to recruit will remain limited given their financial difficulties (about which nothing will be known).

The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Belgium is considered by the PFCECT to be more limited than the French report suggests.

On what these claims are based, the report does not say.

3.4. What the negative reaction to the French report rests on

Section 3.2, entitled “A controversial (French) report and contested conclusions” (§38-47), shows that the report positions itself against the allegations of the French report.

Over two full pages, the Comité R/I compiles exclusively criticisms of the French report published by the Interior Ministry (MI) on May 21, 2025, essentially confining itself to citing experts and researchers who showed themselves critical of the report in the press.

A warning was also issued concerning the political instrumentalization of a report “far less catastrophist than what it is made to say” and “which, essentially, shows that the Muslim Brotherhood is losing momentum.” While praising the historical description of the movement, deemed thorough and documented, several researchers point, by contrast, to the report's “alarmist tone,” reflecting a “moral panic” in France on these issues.

The experts summoned by the Comité R/I worry about an excessive focus on the Muslim Brotherhood, “disproportionately in relation to their real threat and weight,” to the detriment of other more serious threats in a context of limited resources. More generally, “the 'Muslim Brother' label (would serve) as a genuine repellent in public opinion, the risk then being to delegitimize as a Brother any movement or organization structured around openly Muslim personalities engaged on themes such as coexistence or the fight against Islamophobia” (C. Torrekens).

The Comité R/I cites four commentators, all critics of the French report:

1. Olivier Roy - cited via L'Obs (May 23, 2025). Describes the report as “moral panic rhetoric” (§40).
2. Franck Frégosi - cited via Le Monde and France Inter. Denounces an “alarmist tone” and questions the “geopolitical considerations” that guided the choice to target the MB rather than the Salafists (§40, 42).
3. Michaël Privot - cited as an “Islamologist” contesting the label of “European crossroads” attributed to Belgium (§44).
4. Corinne Torrekens - cited via her book Islams de Belgique for the phrase about the “repellent label” (§46).

Media reference presenting the report as controversial: Ayad C., Couvelaire L., “'Entrisme' des Frères musulmans en France : ce que contient le rapport controversé,” Le Monde, May 22, 2025.

No recognized academic who has endorsed all or part of the French report's findings is cited: neither Hugo Micheron, nor Bernard Rougier, nor Gilles Kepel, nor Florence Bergeaud-Blackler (here the author of the present report), nor any French intelligence analyst.

The Committee gives the false impression of an academic consensus against the French report.

3.5. An undisclosed conflict of interest

The case of the expert Michaël Privot deserves particular attention. The Comité R/I presents him as an Islamologist contesting the conclusions of the French report (§44). But:

Michaël Privot was secretary general of FEMYSO (Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations), an organization explicitly identified in the French report as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (p. 34 of the French report, cited at §77 of the Comité R/I's report).

Although he publicly announced his departure from the Brotherhood after having denied his membership in it for years, he continued to hold responsibilities (notably as executive director) at the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), an organization regularly identified as a vector of Muslim Brotherhood influence at the European level.

Citing Privot as a neutral commentator on a report that assesses precisely the organizations in which he held leadership positions constitutes, at the very least, a methodological if not ethical failing.

Failing to disclose this conflict of interest in a report by a parliamentary oversight body is incomprehensible, and even worrying.

3.6. An activist register

The report adopts, in its analytical section, a vocabulary borrowed from the anti-Islamophobia activist register. Two formulations are particularly problematic:

The expression “politics of suspicion” (§45) belongs to activist vocabulary, not to intelligence analysis. The body responsible for overseeing the intelligence services here uses the same register as the organizations it is supposed to help monitor.

This quotation, taken up without critical distance, amounts to suggesting that any identification of a link between an organization and the Muslim Brotherhood risks being equated with stigmatization.

This is precisely the discursive strategy that the intelligence services' own definition describes at §21: “the Muslim Brotherhood never reveals its affiliation with the Brotherhood and denies any link with it.”

The report thus contradicts itself: its factual part (§21) describes the denial of affiliation as a strategy; its analytical part (§46) legitimizes this denial by pathologizing vigilance.

3.7. The French report is judged by standards the Comité R/I does not apply to itself

The Comité R/I reproaches the French report for the “absence of systematic referencing of sources” (§39). Yet the authors of the French report acknowledge it themselves: they are commissioned senior officials, not researchers. The French report is an administrative document, not a peer-reviewed article.

The Comité R/I does not apply this same standard to itself. Its own report contains “syntheses of classified paragraphs” (§49, 68, 70) that the reader must accept without any possible verification, as well as numerous references to unpublished confidential notes.

4. The systematic downplaying of the threat

4.1. A figure frozen for five years

The estimate of “around a hundred individuals” actively participating in the dissemination of MB ideology in Belgium has been unchanged since the 2020 VSSE annual report (p. 13), cited at §23. This same figure is repeated in 2024 (§28) and in 2025 (§29).

The French report puts forward the figure of 200 activists (§77). The Comité R/I notes this divergence (§42) but neither explains nor adjudicates it. It raises no question about the counting methodology or about the reasons why this figure has not changed despite:

• the creation of the PFCECT and the strengthening of capacities;
• the relocation of French actors to Belgium, which the report itself notes (§30);
• the development of new online teaching initiatives (§30).

4.2. The confusion between violent threat and systemic threat

The report is built around a recurring assertion:

This sentence is used as if it exhausted the question of the threat. Yet the services' own definition (§21) identifies four non-violent threats: dissemination of an extremist ideology, damage to social cohesion, subversion of the democratic process and diversion of public funding.

OCAM pushes this logic to the extreme:

The Comité R/I never points out that OCAM is structurally intended to assess the terrorist threat and that it is not equipped to measure a threat of the entryism or institutional subversion type. The PFCECT/OCAM divergence is noted but never resolved analytically.

4.3. The factual allegations of the French report left unassessed

The report reproduces in Annex 1 six excerpts from the French report concerning Belgium (§74-79). These excerpts contain precise factual allegations:

• funding of the LMB by Qatar and Kuwait amounting to 1.2 million euros;
• 60 former Belgian students of the IESH in Château-Chinon forming the core of the Belgian movement;
• reconstitution of the CCIF (dissolved in France) as the CCIE via Belgium;
• control of the association of halal butchers of Belgium;
• five schools under control, using translations of textbooks produced by the CEM;
• exploitation of the MAGIC project by the CIIB for targeted legal proceedings;
• “proliferation of territories controlled by the Islamists” in Belgium.

None of these allegations is assessed individually. The Committee settles for the overall PFCECT position: “the threat assessment [...] diverges” (§50). The reader does not know on which precise points this analysis diverges and on which it converges.

The phrase “partly factual” is revealing: it acknowledges the materiality of part of the alleged facts, but the report never specifies which part is factual and which part is not. For a parliamentary oversight body, this level of imprecision is a failing.

5. Recommendations against the MB that lead to no effect

The Comité R/I had made five recommendations in 2021:

• The VSSE has developed since 2022, in coordination with Belgian intelligence and security partners, both a common vision and strategy around the Muslim Brotherhood phenomenon and a shared definition.
• The Comité R/I welcomed the VSSE's ambition to produce a brochure on the Muslim Brotherhood and to distribute it widely for awareness purposes. The VSSE has used its annual reports to inform and raise public awareness about the Muslim Brotherhood.
• The Comité R/I recommended that the SGRS carry out, in 2022, an analysis to determine whether the resources deployed by the SGRS for monitoring the Muslim Brotherhood were sufficient in view of the estimated probability of the risk of an attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to influence Defense.

The SGRS reported to the Comité R/I that: “As regards monitoring the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the SGRS recalls that it focuses, in accordance with its missions, on the MB threat against Defense and that since 2024, all documents about the MB published by the VSSE as the reference service systematically represent the single, shared viewpoint of the two intelligence services expressed through the PFCECT. The SGRS considers that the establishment of the PFCECT had the benefit, among others, of pooling human capacities in the fight against terrorism and extremism, including the MB, thereby reducing the need to recruit additional staff.”

• The Comité R/I also invited the SGRS to organize internal briefings for the designated security officers in order to raise their awareness of the issue.

SGRS response: “Regarding the awareness-raising of Defense security officers on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) issue, the SGRS wishes to clarify that the training of security officers and their deputies (the 'Basic Security Course' and 'Manager Security Course' training modules) includes a TESSOC component that addresses, among other things, the issues of terrorism and religious extremism, without however limiting them solely to the MB.”

However, the most important recommendation has remained pending:

This recommendation, arising from the Ihsane Haouach affair (a government commissioner whose monitoring by the VSSE had been the subject of a specific investigation in 2021), aimed at putting in place a legislative framework for the screening of candidates for certain public offices: government commissioner, military chaplain and “other key functions at the federal, regional and community levels.”

Five years after this recommendation, the Comité R/I indicates that it “has no information making it possible to determine whether [it] has been acted upon.” Yet the report itself, via the PFCECT note of April 29, 2025 (§31), demonstrates that the risk of entryism into the institutions persists. The absence of a legislative verification framework, five years after the affair that motivated it, is in itself a finding of failure.

The Committee cites European examples (Switzerland, the Netherlands, France) where this type of verification exists (§73, note 78), but makes no new recommendation to relaunch the process.

The Comité R/I recalled its previously made recommendation - in the context of the oversight investigation into how the State Security Service monitored government commissioner Haouach - according to which the exercise of certain public offices requires the prior verification of integrity, loyalty and discretion, as required by the legislation in force in certain European countries.

6. Internal contradictions and overall consistency

The report suffers from several structural contradictions between its factual part and its analytical part.

The report's rhetorical structure is as follows: (1) show that the services are doing their job; (2) accumulate academic and media criticisms of the French report; (3) cite the PFCECT which “sees no indication of Islamist control”; (4) conclude that 4 of 5 recommendations have been acted upon. All while carefully avoiding addressing the substance of the French allegations.

7. Blind spots

7.1. Hamas in a footnote

The presence of Hamas in Belgium is mentioned exclusively in a footnote (note 29):

The existence of an informal Hamas network in Belgium, involved in charitable and lobbying organizations, is dealt with in passing in a 29-page report. No development, no recommendation.

7.2. Online teaching: a new vector ignored

The report notes “the development of new online teaching offerings conveying Muslim Brotherhood ideology and polarizing discourse” (§30). This vector, transnational by nature and difficult to control, is the subject of no specific recommendation.

7.3. The consequences of the French relocation left unassessed

The report notes the “relocation of certain actors to Belgium” following French pressure (§30), but draws no consequence from it: no reassessment of the figure of 100 activists, no strengthening of surveillance, no recommendation for specific Franco-Belgian cooperation.

7.4. The five Brussels municipalities: rejection without investigation

The French report mentions Brussels municipalities “where the Islamists' social control over society appears almost complete.” The Comité R/I rejects this claim as emanating from a “conspiratorial framework” (§43), citing a press article.

The Committee does not say: “we verified and this claim is unfounded.” It says: “commentators reject this claim.” For a body that has the legal capacity to question the intelligence services, deferring to the press is an admission of powerlessness or of disinterest.

8. Conclusion

Report 2025.319 of the Comité R/I is a useful institutional document for its factual elements - common definition, organizational structure of the MB, warning about the CIIB - but deeply problematic in its analytical part.

Its main failings are:

1. A systematic bias in the choice of sources: exclusively critics of the French report, no dissenting voice, with the uncontextualized citation of a former FEMYSO leader as a neutral “Islamologist.”
2. The importation of an activist register (“politics of suspicion,” “stigmatization,” “repellent label”) incompatible with the neutrality expected of a parliamentary oversight body.
3. The absence of a point-by-point assessment of the factual allegations of the French report concerning Belgium, replaced by an overall PFCECT position that “diverges” without one knowing precisely on what.
4. Unresolved internal contradictions between the characterization of a “high and priority threat” (§26) and the systematic relativization carried out in the analytical part.
5. The absence of new recommendations in the face of developments that were nonetheless observed (French relocation, online teaching, Hamas in Belgium).
6. Prolonged inaction on the recommendation for integrity vetting for sensitive public offices, five years after the Haouach affair.

The report reveals, by implication, a Belgian institutional unease in the face of the Muslim Brotherhood question. The intelligence services (PFCECT) characterize MB ideology as extremist and the threat as a priority. OCAM sees no concrete threat in it. The Comité R/I, rather than resolving this divergence, presents it without deciding and drowns it in a profusion of media reactions that stand in for analysis.

The underlying question remains: should a parliamentary oversight body relay, without critical distance, the positions of engaged commentators - some of them linked to the organizations examined - or should it produce its own independent assessment of the facts?

9. CERIF's recommendations

In light of the foregoing analysis, CERIF makes the following recommendations to the parliamentary monitoring committee and the competent Belgian authorities.

9.1. Adapt the institutional apparatus to the specific nature of the threat

1. Create a unit to assess the non-violent threat. OCAM is structurally designed for the terrorist threat. The Muslim Brotherhood threat - entryism, institutional influence, subversion of the democratic process - falls outside its remit. It would be advisable either to formally broaden OCAM's mandate or to create a dedicated unit within the PFCECT, equipped with indicators specific to the non-violent threat: capture of public funding, entryism into advisory bodies, influence in educational networks, networking strategies.
2. Establish a legislative framework for integrity vetting. The Comité R/I's 2021 recommendation, arising from the Haouach affair, went unheeded for five years. Belgium should draw on existing European legislation (Switzerland, the Netherlands, France) to put in place screening of candidates for certain exposed public offices: government commissioners, military chaplains, members of advisory bodies, heads of subsidized structures.

9.2. Strengthen analytical capacities

3. Require a periodic methodological reassessment of the figures. A figure of “around a hundred activists” frozen since 2020 cannot constitute a reliable indicator. The parliamentary committee should require the PFCECT to provide a transparent counting methodology, explicit identification criteria and an annual update.
4. Develop intelligence on financial flows. The French report mentions funding of the LMB by Qatar and Kuwait amounting to 1.2 million euros. The Comité R/I does not assess this allegation. The PFCECT should have a dedicated financial-analysis capacity for tracing the funds passing through the identified organizations.
5. Map online teaching. The development of new online educational offerings conveying MB ideology is flagged by the PFCECT (§30) but is the subject of no recommendation. This vector, transnational by nature, requires European cooperation and dedicated monitoring.

9.3. Guarantee the analytical independence of the Comité R/I

6. Diversify the sources in oversight reports. A parliamentary oversight body's report cannot cite exclusively commentators critical of a foreign report, while systematically ignoring the researchers and analysts who have endorsed its findings. The Comité R/I should hold itself to the adversarial principle, presenting the positions of the entire academic spectrum and disclosing any conflict of interest.
7. Separate the factual register from the media register. Press reactions and commentators' positions must not stand in for intelligence analysis. When a factual allegation is made (such as the “control” of five Brussels municipalities), the Comité R/I should verify it with the services it oversees, not reject it by citing a press article.
8. Assess the factual allegations individually. The seven specific allegations of the French report concerning Belgium (funding, the network of IESH graduates, the reconstitution of the CCIF, schools, halal butchers, CIIB/MAGIC, controlled territories) should be the subject of a point-by-point response, indicating for each whether it is confirmed, refuted or unverifiable.

9.4. Bring Franco-Belgian cooperation into coherence

9. Establish a specific bilateral exchange framework. The report notes the “relocation of French actors to Belgium” without drawing any operational consequence from it. French pressure on Muslim Brotherhood structures mechanically produces a shift toward Belgium. A dedicated Franco-Belgian bilateral cooperation, integrating intelligence, counter-financing and surveillance of cross-border structures, should be formalized.
10. Document the Hamas network in Belgium. The existence of an informal Hamas network involved in charitable and lobbying organizations is mentioned in a footnote. It deserves full development and its own recommendations.

9.5. Rethink the posture toward the non-violent threat

Belgium's fundamental difficulty in the face of the Muslim Brotherhood threat is a difficulty of interpretive framework. The services have inherited an apparatus designed for the terrorist threat - detection of violent intent, prevention of moving to action, assessment of physical danger. Faced with a movement that precisely refuses physical violence but seeks to transform society from within, this apparatus is structurally inadequate.

The absence of violent actions by the MB in Belgium is not a sign of a weak threat: on the contrary, it is their declared mode of operation, as defined by the services themselves. To invoke this absence of violence in order to relativize the threat amounts to confusing the symptom with the strategy.

The underlying question remains: should a parliamentary oversight body relay, without critical distance, the positions of engaged commentators - some of them linked to the organizations under examination - or should it produce its own independent assessment of the facts? The answer to this question will determine Belgium's capacity to confront a threat that it has itself defined, characterized and classified as a priority - but which it still refuses, in practice, to treat as such.

Dr Florence Bergeaud-Blackler
Anthropologist, Research Fellow at the CNRS (HDR)
Founding President of CERIF - European Center for Research and Information on the Muslim Brotherhood
cerif.eu