Key points
- A JL Partners poll (2,223 Britons, oversample of 1,031 British Muslims, 2-13 March 2026) measures attitudes toward the US-Israeli strikes on Iran launched on 28 February 2026.
- The note finds net-favorability gaps between British Muslims and the general public of 64 points on Iran (+22 versus -42), 54 points on Russia (+2 versus -52) and 44 points on China (+22 versus -22).
- The gap transcends the doctrinal divide: 84% of British Muslims are Sunni, yet their sympathy for Shia Iran exceeds the sympathy they feel for Sunni Saudi Arabia. The author invokes the concept of the Ummah and a structural anti-Americanism.
- The rift comes with a diversification of information sources (Al Jazeera, TikTok, Instagram, WhatsApp, podcasts) that places young British Muslims in a distinct media ecosystem, posing a social-cohesion challenge in a Britain where the local becomes “glocal.”
1. The document and its publisher
- Nature of the document. A “Research Note,” Policy Exchange's short format (10 pages), designed to circulate commented poll data quickly on a pressing news topic. It is not an academic report but a policy analysis note.
- Author. Dr Rakib Ehsan, Senior Fellow at Policy Exchange, a British researcher of Bangladeshi Muslim background, a specialist in immigration, integration and identity. Author of several Policy Exchange notes on the census and asylum.
- Publisher. Policy Exchange, a British think tank founded in 2002, based in London, registered as an “educational charity” (no. 1096300) and presenting itself as “independent, non-partisan.” Its board is chaired, among others, by Alexander Downer and includes Andrew Roberts and Simon Wolfson.
- Publication context. Surprise US-Israeli strikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran launched on 28 February 2026, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran retaliated with drones and missiles against Israel, American bases and the United Arab Emirates. An RAF base (Akrotiri, Cyprus) was targeted. The United Kingdom is not directly involved militarily.
- Stated purpose. To document, through polling, the differing attitudes of British Muslims and the British general public toward the Iran conflict and the international order, and to examine their implications for social cohesion in the United Kingdom.
2. Methodology
- Polling firm. JL Partners, a member of the British Polling Council (BPC), the body that certifies the methodological transparency of polls in the United Kingdom.
- Samples. A nationally representative sample of 2,223 British adults + a targeted oversample of 1,031 British Muslims.
- Recruitment method. Online panel.
- Weighting. National sample: gender, age, region, education level, ethnicity, level of political attention, vote in the 2024 general election. Muslim sample: gender, age, region, education level, ethnicity.
- Fieldwork. From 2 to 13 March 2026, i.e. 2 to 13 days after the US-Israeli strikes began.
- Margins of error. +/- 2.1 points for the national results, +/- 3.1 points for the results on the Muslim subsample.
- Type of analysis. Descriptive analysis (single-variable frequency tables, comparisons of means between the general sample and the Muslim subsample).
3. Central thesis
British Muslims form a geopolitically distinct subset of the rest of the British population: not only more hostile to the United States and Israel - which could be attributed to the situation in Gaza - but also markedly more favorable to the so-called “revisionist” powers that seek to challenge American hegemony, namely Iran, Russia and China. This divergence reaches, on some items, up to a 64-point gap in net favorability and extends beyond the framework of the Iran conflict alone.
According to the author, this configuration is not explained by the doctrinal divide within Islam: 84% of British Muslims are Sunni (IIFL 2024 data) and yet they support Shia Iran more than Sunni Saudi Arabia. The author invokes three converging explanatory mechanisms: (i) a sense of belonging to the Ummah - the global Islamic community that transcends national and ethno-racial borders -, (ii) a structural anti-Americanism shared with regimes hostile to the West, (iii) cultural and diasporic legacies (the leading national origin of British Muslims is Pakistan, which maintains an “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” with China; in Russia, Islam is one of the recognized and state-subsidized traditional religions).
On top of this divergence of opinion comes a divergence in the media ecosystem: British Muslims, younger than average (median age 27 versus 40 for the general population of England and Wales according to the 2021 census), get their information primarily via Al Jazeera, TikTok, Instagram, WhatsApp and podcasts/YouTubers. This twofold decoupling - cognitive and media-related - constitutes, according to the author, a major social-cohesion challenge in a Britain where international conflicts translate immediately into local community tensions (“glocal” logic).
4. Argumentative structure
The note unfolds six connected demonstrations: demonstration 1 sets out the general British national context; demonstrations 2 and 3 measure the gap between British Muslims and the general public on the conflict and then on attitudes toward states; demonstration 4 addresses the Sunni/Shia doctrinal paradox; demonstration 5 documents the divergence of information sources; demonstration 6 connects the properly local dimension (social cohesion) to the international dimension (“glocal” logic). Each demonstration is presented below according to the triad What is demonstrated - From what data - Interpretation, in order to distinguish the evidential content of the data used from the reading the author proposes of it.
4.1. The British public rejects military involvement
What is demonstrated. That the majority position in the United Kingdom on the US-Israeli strikes on Iran is neutrality, followed by strictly diplomatic support - never military.
From what data. 48% of Britons oppose the United Kingdom taking part in the strikes; only 18% support them. The most popular position is neutrality (29%), followed by “diplomatic support only” (22%). Nearly 80% believe that energy and fuel prices will rise; nearly half say they are “very concerned” about the conflict's impact on the cost of living. The conflict is followed intensely in public opinion (62% of the general public say they are following events closely - an exceptionally high rate for a foreign-policy topic without direct military involvement).
Interpretation. The author presents this state of opinion as the general backdrop against which the position of British Muslims will then be measured. He stresses the degree of public attention to a foreign-policy topic without direct British military involvement, and the emergence of the cost of living as a central determinant of opposition to British military involvement.
4.2. British Muslims assess the strikes differently
What is demonstrated. That the reading of the facts themselves diverges between the two populations: not only the opinion on the military action, but also the perception of the prior Iranian threat and the attribution of motives.
From what data. Before the strikes, 14% of the general public believed that Iran did not represent a significant threat; that share rises to 45% among British Muslims. On the presumed motivation for the strikes, 40% of British Muslims (versus 15% of the general public) cite seizing control of hydrocarbons. And 50% of British Muslims judge the strikes “definitively wrong” (categorically unjustified), versus 17% of the general public. On the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the general public is divided while British Muslims overwhelmingly judge it unjustified.
Interpretation. The author concludes that there is a “profound divergence” in the way events and their developments are interpreted by the two populations. The gap, in his view, concerns simultaneously the moral assessment of the military action, the prior perception of the Iranian threat and the attribution of motivations - with British Muslims placing, far more often than the general public, the seizing of control of hydrocarbons as the primary motive for the strikes.
4.3. Attitudes toward states diverge radically
What is demonstrated. That the divergence is not limited to the Iran conflict: it extends to the structural perception of all the major powers and regional powers, drawing two opposing geopolitical maps.
From what data. The report presents net favorabilities (favorable minus unfavorable) in points.
| Country | General public | British Muslims |
|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | +33 | +25 |
| United States | -16 | -41 |
| Israel | -22 | -52 |
| Iran | -42 | +22 |
| Saudi Arabia | -9 | +11 |
| Russia | -52 | +2 |
| China | -22 | +22 |
Source: JL Partners for Policy Exchange, March 2026 (Table 1, p. 6).
Interpretation. The author reads these gaps as coherent with one another, structured by a general anti-Americanism that goes beyond the Iran conflict alone. Three points are highlighted: the gap on Iran (64 points) exceeds the one that usually separates 18-24-year-olds from the rest of the population, which leads the author to rule out the hypothesis of a mere “generational” effect; Russia and China - generally off-putting to British opinion - achieve a positive net favorability among British Muslims; Saudi Arabia obtains a higher favorability in the general public than in the British Muslim population, which the author uses to rule out a purely denominational reading of the pro-Iranian sympathy.
4.4. The Sunni/Shia divide is not enough
What is demonstrated. That British Muslims' sympathy for the Islamic Republic of Iran - a regime the author describes as a “Shia military-theocratic dictatorship” - cannot be explained by a logic of denominational solidarity, since the great majority of British Muslims are Sunni.
From what data. According to the March 2024 report by the Institute for the Impact of Faith in Life (IIFL), 84% of British Muslims are Sunni (all tendencies combined: non-denominational, Deobandi, Barelvi, Salafi, etc.); Shia make up 7 to 8% of the British Muslim population. Yet British Muslims are more favorable to Shia Iran (+22) than to Sunni Saudi Arabia (+11).
Interpretation. The author concludes that geopolitical consideration prevails over what he calls denominational tribalism among British Muslims. To account for the pro-Iranian sympathy, he marshals a cluster of converging hypotheses - disillusionment with Saudi Arabia's earlier willingness to normalize its relations with Israel, attachment to the concept of the Ummah, structuring anti-Americanism - which he suggests work together (“a mixture of geopolitical, religious, and cultural considerations”).
4.5. A distinct media ecosystem
What is demonstrated. That British Muslims get their information through channels significantly different from those of the general public, and that this diversification is correlated with their demographic youth.
From what data. 81% of British Muslims follow the Iran conflict closely, versus 62% of the general public. On the sources used: Al Jazeera 22% among British Muslims versus 3% in the general public; TikTok 27% versus 11%; Instagram 26% versus 10%; WhatsApp 14% versus 5%; podcasts and YouTube commentators 9% versus 3%. The BBC remains the leading source for both populations (56% among British Muslims, 61% in the general public). The 2021 census attests to the demographic youth of the subgroup: median age 27 for Muslims versus 40 for England and Wales as a whole; 84.5% of Muslims are under 50 versus 62% of the general population.
| Information source | General public | British Muslims |
|---|---|---|
| BBC News | 61 % | 56 % |
| ITV News | 29 % | 22 % |
| Sky News | 24 % | 35 % |
| Channel 4 News | 11 % | 15 % |
| Al Jazeera | 3 % | 22 % |
| 15 % | 20 % | |
| 10 % | 26 % | |
| TikTok | 11 % | 27 % |
| 5 % | 14 % | |
| Podcasts and YouTube commentators | 3 % | 9 % |
Source: JL Partners for Policy Exchange, March 2026 (Table 2, p. 8).
Interpretation. The author interprets the diversification of sources as correlated with the relatively young demographic profile of the British Muslim population. He sees in it the emergence of a “politically engaged and technologically able generation” (highly politically-engaged and technologically-able) of well-educated British Muslims who reach beyond traditional, established information sources. Among the vectors of information circulation, he points to the role of podcasts and YouTube commentators (“podcast bros”) and that of family WhatsApp groups.
4.6. The “glocal” logic and the social-cohesion challenge
What is demonstrated. That geopolitical conflicts with a religio-political dimension immediately spill over into local community relations in Britain, and that this “spillover” is now perceptible even in general public opinion.
From what data. Two Britons in five believe the Iran conflict has already worsened ethnic and religious relations in the United Kingdom (11% “much worse” + 29% “somewhat worse” in the general public; 16% + 21% among British Muslims). The author places this dynamic in the wake of October 7, 2023: a collapse of the Muslim vote for Labour in favor of the Greens or of independent candidates combining domestic grievances (public services, housing) and foreign-policy positions (Palestine, Kashmir), as illustrated by the February 2026 by-election in the constituency of Gorton and Denton (Greater Manchester).
| Response | General public | British Muslims |
|---|---|---|
| Much worse | 11 % | 16 % |
| Somewhat worse | 29 % | 21 % |
| No difference | 28 % | 31 % |
| Somewhat better | 8 % | 12 % |
| Much better | 3 % | 6 % |
| Don't know | 22 % | 15 % |
Source: JL Partners for Policy Exchange, March 2026 (p. 10; the source numbers this table “Table 2,” which is an error - it is the report's third table).
Interpretation. The author links the sociology of opinion to a political analysis: he places the dynamic of perceived deterioration in the wake of October 7, 2023 and adds an electoral dimension to it - erosion of the Muslim vote for Labour, the rise of the Greens and of Muslim independents combining domestic grievances (public services, housing) and positions on Gaza and Kashmir. The “glocal” dimension is thus, in his text, not a theoretical hypothesis but a documentable electoral reality. He concludes that policymakers, civil servants and grassroots actors face the serious challenge of building a more cohesive and resilient society in a volatile and uncertain geopolitical environment.
5. The author's conclusion
- A distinct reading of the conflict and of the international order. British Muslims interpret both the Iran conflict and, more broadly, international relations through a lens that sets them apart from the British general public: more hostile to the United States and Israel, more favorable to Iran.
- Less hostility toward the so-called “revisionist” powers. Sympathy for Russia and China - read by the author as powers seeking to consign “American hegemonic power to the dustbin of history” - is markedly stronger than in the general public, and is part of a general anti-Americanism that goes beyond the Iran conflict alone.
- A “separation” on Western geopolitics. The author explicitly concludes that there is a “separation of sorts” between British Muslims and the general public in how they read Western affairs.
- A distinct media ecosystem, correlated with youth. The Muslim population, younger on average, draws more on non-traditional online channels (Al Jazeera, social media, podcasts/YouTubers) than on “legacy” British sources.
- Community relations that have become “glocal.” Social cohesion in the United Kingdom is now shaped by international events with a religio-political dimension, a dynamic that emerged in the wake of October 7, 2023; two Britons in five believe that ethnic and religious relations have already deteriorated as a result of the Iran conflict.
- A cohesion challenge for British policymakers. The author concludes on the challenge facing policymakers, civil servants and grassroots actors: building a cohesive and resilient society in a volatile and uncertain geopolitical environment.
Dr Florence Bergeaud-Blackler
Anthropologist, Research Fellow at the CNRS (HDR)
Founding President of CERIF - European Center for Research and Information on the Muslim Brotherhood
cerif.eu
CERIF commentary
Contribution. Drawing on the March 2026 JL Partners poll, the note quantifies the gap in attitudes between British Muslims and the British general public on the Iran conflict and, more broadly, on international relations. Measured simultaneously across seven states (United Kingdom, United States, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China), this gap shows internal coherence and is observed beyond the Sunni/Shia doctrinal divide, even though the great majority of British Muslims are Sunni.
Limitations. The analysis remains descriptive: without multivariate analysis, the respective weight of the factors (age, migratory generation, religious practice, politico-religious tendencies internal to British Islam, social class) is not measured. The concept of the Ummah is used as an explanatory variable but not operationalized by the questionnaire; the role of digital religious influencers at the heart of the media ecosystem in Table 2 remains undocumented; and the scope stays strictly British, with no historical or European comparison.
Why read it. At a 64-point gap on Iran, 54 on Russia, 44 on China, British Muslims and the rest of the British population do not read the world the same way. The note documents this gap and shows it to be structural - not the effect of the current conflict alone. Beyond the British case, it poses in empirical terms a question that runs through European societies: how religious and diasporic affiliations shape national public opinion.