Understanding Islamopopulism

Key points

• The first report in a series announced by Policy Exchange devoted to a newly named political object: “Islamopopulism.” It documents, through polling, the drift of the geographically concentrated Muslim electorate and the gap between its positions and those of the general British population.
• Collapse of the Muslim Labour vote in the areas studied: 41% in July 2024, 33% in April 2026. The Greens (27%) and pro-Gaza independents (14%) are the main beneficiaries. Very broad anti-Labour tactical voting: 60% are considering voting for a pro-Gaza independent.
• Considerable gaps with the general population on fundamental freedoms: 52% in favor of criminalizing images of Muhammad (17% in the general population); 24% consider violence a legitimate response to a Quran burning (10% in the general population).
• Structural antisemitism and worrying favorability toward proscribed terrorist organizations: 42 to 45% consider that Jews have too much power over the banks, Parliament, the media; 25% have a favorable opinion of Hamas, 23% of the Iranian IRGC, 16% of ISIS, 15% of Al-Qaeda.

1. Presentation of the document and authors

• Publication. Policy Exchange, Westminster, 2026 (ISBN 978-1-918832-00-6).
• Position. The first in a planned series on “Islamopopulism.”
• Definition given by the authors. A populist movement among Britain's four million Muslims, characterized by a shift of the vote toward candidates “willing to make a communal appeal” (pro-Gaza independents, the Green Party, Your Party). Its own organizational vehicles: The Muslim Vote (TMV) and Vote Palestine, aimed at “punishing” Labour and the Conservatives.
• Authors. Rakib Ehsan (Senior Fellow, a researcher of Bangladeshi Muslim background, immigration and integration); Andrew Gilligan (Senior Fellow, former adviser to the Prime Minister 2019-2022, co-author of A False Compromise - CERIF summary 2026/05); Paul Stott (Security and Extremism, Policy Exchange).

2. Survey methodology

• Operator. JL Partners (a member of the British Polling Council), for Policy Exchange. Two simultaneous online surveys, April 2026.
• Muslim sample. 1,006 adults, 16-27 April 2026. Non-national recruitment, exclusively in areas of high Muslim concentration: Greater London, the West Midlands, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, plus certain local authorities in Lancashire, South Yorkshire and Merseyside.
• General sample. 1,025 British adults, 16-21 April 2026, nationally representative.
• Margins of error and weightings. 3.1% for both. Quotas on gender, age, region, ethnicity, education, 2024 vote, political attention.
• Function of the design. Systematic comparison: each figure reads as a gap, not as an absolute characterization.

3. Central thesis

The report seeks to establish, through a comparative polling design, that there exists in Britain a distinct political movement, described as Islamopopulist, structured by a religious communal appeal, endowed with its own organizational vehicles (The Muslim Vote, Vote Palestine), capable of large-scale tactical mobilization, and holding, on certain fundamental subjects, positions very far removed from those of the general British population. The implicit but decisive thesis of the design is that a rigorous comparison with a general-population sample, surveyed under the same conditions, defuses the objection that highlighting these differences would itself stem from an Islamophobic stance.

4. The report's demonstrations

How to read: all figures contrast Muslims in the areas studied (first number) with the general British population (second number). Source: Policy Exchange / JL Partners, April 2026 surveys, n = 1,006 / 1,025.

The report sets out eight main demonstrations, grouped into four thematic families (see diagram above). For each, we first indicate what the authors seek to establish, then the data mobilized, and finally the analysis the text offers.

a) The collapse of Muslim Labour support has been worsening since 2024

What is demonstrated. The break between a significant fraction of the concentrated Muslim electorate and the Labour Party, already under way at the July 2024 general election, continues and intensifies in spring 2026.

The data. Among Muslim respondents in the areas studied who voted in July 2024, 41% had voted Labour - a figure already down dramatically, the authors stress, from the “exceptionally high” levels of the Corbyn era. In April 2026, Labour voting intention is no more than 33%, eight points lower in less than two years. Over the same period, the Green Party (under the leadership of Zack Polanski) rises from 18% to 27%. Pro-Gaza independent candidates hold at 14%. The Conservatives edge up slightly (from 6% to 9%), Reform UK goes from 3% to 5%.

Analysis. The Greens appear as the main national beneficiaries of Labour's erosion in this electorate. The report also highlights a generational gap: among Muslims in the areas studied aged 18 to 24, pro-Gaza independents reach nearly three voters in ten and are the top choice of this age group. Young Muslims, and university graduates especially, are the least likely to vote Labour.

b) The rejection of Labour translates into a very broad willingness to vote tactically

What is demonstrated. Beyond raw voting intentions, it is the scale of the willingness to vote tactically against Labour that reveals the depth of the rejection.

The data. 60% of the Muslims surveyed would consider voting for an independent candidate whose main position was to “support Gaza and oppose Israel,” for the sole purpose of preventing a Labour candidate from winning locally. To make the Conservatives lose, the figure falls to 57%. To make Reform UK lose, to 55%. For the Green Party: 49% would consider a tactical vote against Labour, 48% against the Conservatives, 48% against Reform UK.

Analysis. The near-equivalence of the figures for Labour, the Conservatives and Reform UK leads the authors to a striking conclusion: Labour is now as unpopular as, if not more than, the parties traditionally perceived as hostile to Muslims. Anti-Labour tactical voting rivals anti-Reform tactical voting in intensity.

c) Signs of potential electoral fraud disproportionately present

What is demonstrated. Three practices associated with electoral fraud or with breaches of voting autonomy are disproportionately reported by Muslim respondents in the areas studied.

The data. 9% of the Muslims surveyed report having handed their blank ballot to a third party, versus 4% in the general population (double the rate). 14% report having seen their postal vote collected by a candidate, campaigner or political activist, versus 8% in the general population - a practice nonetheless made illegal by the 2022 Elections Act. 16% report having received an election leaflet written in a language other than English, versus 10% in the general population.

Analysis. The authors make a politically charged observation: “earlier concerns on this question were dismissed as a form of racism or Islamophobia.” Yet the data presented here suggest that potential electoral fraud is “disproportionately a problem in relatively segregated Muslim communities.” The chronological sequence matters: the mechanism of political neutralization, through the accusation of Islamophobia, preceded the production of the data that contradict it.

d) The primacy of religious identity over British national identity

What is demonstrated. Religious identity holds first place in the identity structure of Muslims in the areas studied, above British national identity.

The data. When respondents are asked to rank their religious, ethnic, British national and local identities in order of importance, 63% of Muslims in the areas studied place religious identity first (75% among those who attend the mosque more than once a week outside special occasions). In the general population, only 12% do the same, versus 43% who place British national identity first. Conversely, only 12% of Muslims in the areas studied place British identity first. But 74% of them say British identity is nonetheless “important” to them personally (38% “very important,” 37% “fairly important”).

Analysis. The report takes care to avoid a caricatured reading: this is not a head-on rejection of British identity, but a ranking in which the religious occupies first position. The report characterizes the general population as rapidly secularized, and it is this structural gap - a Muslim majority that ranks the religious first against a general majority that marginalizes it - that constitutes the main finding.

e) The “Gaza-centrism” of electoral concerns

What is demonstrated. The Israel-Gaza issue holds an exceptional place in the voting priorities of Muslims in the areas studied, qualitatively different from the place it holds in the general population.

The data. Asked about the three most decisive issues for their vote in the April 2026 local elections - twenty themes were offered - 25% of Muslims in the areas studied select Israel-Gaza, the second issue behind the cost of living, ahead of the economy (21%), housing (20%), health (19%), crime (13%) and education (12%). The figure rises to 43% among 18-24 year-olds. In the general population, only 5% place Israel-Gaza among their three priorities. Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hostility (the subject of the previous report A False Compromise) are cited by 22% of Muslims in the areas studied (24% among 18-24 year-olds), versus 2% in the general population. On concrete policies: 59% of Muslims in the areas studied support a one-penny-in-the-pound increase in income tax to fund a government fund dedicated to the reconstruction of Gaza (20% in the general population); 48% support banning all Israeli technology within the National Health Service (18% in the general population).

Analysis. The gap is not only quantitative (one in four versus one in twenty). It is qualitative: Israel-Gaza is, for this population, a major determinant of the local vote - even though it is a foreign-policy issue. The political agenda thus differs from the rest of the country in its very structure, not only in its intensity.

f) A fracture over the very principles of freedom of expression

What is demonstrated. On questions of blasphemy and religiously motivated violence, the authors establish that “much of the general population fundamentally disagrees with the majority of British Muslims living in the areas studied.” The report explicitly poses the question: “will the [United Kingdom's] liberal democratic values, particularly its traditions of freedom of expression, survive in the face of assertive Islamic thought within a steadily growing Muslim population?”

The data. 52% of Muslims in the areas studied support criminalizing the production or public display of images depicting the Prophet Muhammad, versus 17% in the general population; 36% “strongly support” this criminalization versus 8% in the general population. 63% support criminalizing the burning of holy books (Bible and Quran included) in public space, versus 37% in the general population; 50% “strongly support” this criminalization versus 19%. 24% consider that violence can be a legitimate response to someone who burns a Quran or produces an image of Muhammad, versus 10% in the general population; only 48% of Muslims believe that violence can never be a legitimate response, versus 63% in the general population.

Analysis. The 24% figure is the central quantitative indicator of this section. It does not measure an intention to act, but a theoretical legitimization of violence in the case of an offense against the sacred. The gap on this point - one Muslim in four in the areas studied versus one in ten in the general population - is, in the economy of the report, what justifies the subtitle Views of Concern.

g) An effective demand to reconfigure the norms of public space

What is demonstrated. The gaps measured on the separation of the sexes and on the place of dogs in public space reveal a social demand to adapt common norms to specific religious prescriptions.

The data. The report first spells out the theological framework: ikhtilat (unregulated mixing of unrelated men and women, deemed prohibited to preserve modesty), fitnah (temptation), zina (sexual sin), najis (ritual impurity, applied notably to saliva and to the wet coat of dogs). On this basis: 32% of Muslims in the areas studied support a stronger encouragement of the separation of the sexes in public space, versus 17% in the general population; only 14% strongly oppose it, versus 50% in the general population. On dogs: 27% of Muslims in the areas studied support banning them from most outdoor public spaces, versus 19% in the general population; conversely, 32% oppose this, versus 55% in the general population (including 34% “strongly”).

Analysis. The authors insist: these results are not about private personal preferences, but about positions relating to the arrangement of shared public space. The questions asked explicitly concerned the “encouragement” of the separation of the sexes and the “banning” of dogs in outdoor public space.

h) Structural antisemitism and favorability toward proscribed terrorist organizations

What is demonstrated. Two converging findings: a measurable and structured antisemitism, more pronounced among higher-education graduates; and concerning levels of favorability toward organizations proscribed by the British Home Office.

The data - on antisemitism. The net favorability rating of Jews stands at +5 among Muslims in the areas studied (26% favorable, 21% unfavorable), versus +25 in the general population (36% favorable, 11% unfavorable). It is the widest gap among all the religious groups measured. On the perception of the “excessive power” of Jews (Muslims / general population): banking system 42% / 18%; British Parliament 39% / 17%; the media 45% / 19%; the pharmaceutical industry 31% / 13%; the entertainment and music industry 34% / 12%; the arms industry 43% / 17%; the judicial system 36% / 15%. A figure singled out by the authors: 50% of higher-education-graduate Muslims consider that Jews have too much power over the media.

The data - on terrorist organizations. Hamas: 25% favorable opinion versus 28% unfavorable. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (IRGC): 23% / 20%, a positive net rating of +4. Hezbollah: 17% / 29%. Houthis: 20% / 22%. Islamic State (ISIS): 16% / 45%. Al-Qaeda: 15% / 43%. Al-Shabaab: 15% / 26%. Afghan Taliban: 14% / 42%.

Analysis. The authors describe these levels as concerning. Two points stand out. First, the contrast between the level of antisemitism and the comparatively positive favorability toward atheists (net rating +19): in other words, antisemitism does not derive from a general rejection of religious otherness but specifically targets Jews. Second, the minority but notable favorability toward Hamas (25%), the IRGC (23%), ISIS (16%), Al-Qaeda (15%) or the Afghan Taliban (14%), all proscribed by the British Home Office.

5. Three transposable methodological operations

Beyond its content, the report offers three methodological lessons that our own work can retain.

First, the geographic targeting of electorally salient areas rather than a nationally representative sample. This approach, explicitly assumed to be non-representative, makes it possible to target the population in which Islamopopulism seeks to mobilize, and avoids diluting the gaps in the national average. For the French case, a comparable survey of targeted constituencies - which our qualitative work has already identified - would probably yield analogous data.

Second, the systematic comparison with a general-population sample surveyed simultaneously by the same institute, with the same methods and the same wording of the questions. This dual survey turns each raw figure into a measured gap, which defuses the accusation of stigmatization: the report does not characterize Muslims' opinions in the absolute, but their distance from or proximity to general British opinion.

Third, the disaggregation by age and by level of education, which reveals results that common assumptions do not allow one to anticipate: on several indicators (independent vote, antisemitism, place of the religious), young Muslims in the areas studied (18-24) and university graduates prove more radicalized than their elders and than non-graduates, not the reverse.

6. Possible contributions to our work

For the CERIF corpus and the 10 June colloquium, this report offers several direct benefits.

It is the first quantitative document establishing the existence of a British Islamopopulism distinct from classical populisms, endowed with identified organizational vehicles (The Muslim Vote, Vote Palestine), identified electoral geographies and a structured political repertoire (anti-Labour tactical voting). This categorization, handled with care, can be usefully compared with the phenomena observable in France and French-speaking Belgium, within the comparative chapter we are preparing.

The figures are directly usable in parliamentary committee to empirically support qualitative intuitions that have until now been contestable - notably on the criminalization of blasphemy, on the legitimization of violence in the case of an offense against the sacred, on the separation of the sexes in public space and on antisemitism.

The authors' explicit openness to a sectarian reading of Muslim candidacies - they note that the word sectarian is applied to these campaigns with a near-reflexive response of accusing racism or Islamophobia, and ask whether this reflexive accusation is itself founded - aligns with our analyses of the political neutralization function of the accusation of Islamophobia. It is a useful reinforcement for arguments we have already developed.

Finally, the empirical finding of a diploma/radicality effect, measured here in figures, contradicts an assumption still dominant in France according to which educational investment would suffice to produce assimilation to republican values.

7. The authors' conclusions

• A structured movement. “Britain faces a growing populist movement among its four million Muslims” - a phenomenon distinct from right-wing and left-wing populisms, with its own organizational vehicles.
• Labour bleeding confirmed. Labour is losing Muslim electoral support massively and lastingly, mainly to the Greens and pro-Gaza independents. Reform UK remains marginal in this electorate (5%).
• Gaza-orientation. Muslims in the areas studied are “Gaza-oriented”: the Israel-Gaza issue structures their voting priority to the point of coming ahead of health, housing and crime.
• Fracture over liberal values. “One of the most pressing questions in modern Britain is whether its liberal democratic values - particularly its traditions of freedom of expression - will survive in the face of assertive Islamic thought within a steadily growing Muslim population.”
• Antisemitism and terrorist organizations. High levels of antisemitism and levels described as “concerning” of favorability toward organizations proscribed by the Home Office.
• Electoral fraud. Earlier concerns, dismissed as “racism” or “Islamophobia,” now appear substantiated: potential fraud is disproportionately a problem in relatively segregated Muslim communities.
• An open sectarian question. The label “sectarian” applied to Muslim candidacies prompts a reflexive response of accusing racism; the authors pose the question in open terms: “Is it really?”
• A national cohesion issue. “These questions are fundamental to the future cohesion of the United Kingdom.” The Policy Exchange program announces further reports, surveys and focus group exercises.

Dr Florence Bergeaud-Blackler
Anthropologist, Research Fellow at the CNRS (HDR)
Founding President of CERIF - European Center for Research and Information on the Muslim Brotherhood
cerif.eu